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GLD-177        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1550 
 ___________ 
 
 GREGORY THOMAS, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
HONORABLE DARNELL C. JONES, II; THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF 
PHILADELPHIA COUNTY; HONORABLE D. WEBSTER KEOGH, Administrative 
Judge of the Court of Criminal Justice Center; MAYOR OF THE CITY OF 
PHILADELPHIA; THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-02246) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Joseph H. Rodriguez 
 ____________________________________ 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
 or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 5, 2011 
 Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES AND GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: May 19, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Gregory Thomas appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his 
 2 
 
complaint.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise a plenary standard 
of review.  See Gelman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 
2009).  Because this appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm 
the District Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
In 1989, Thomas was convicted in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas of 
first- and second-degree murder and sentenced to two concurrent terms of life 
imprisonment.  The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the judgment, and the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Thomas’s petition for allowance of appeal.  The 
Pennsylvania courts likewise denied relief to Thomas on collateral review.  Thomas then 
filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in which he alleged, among other things, that his 
trial counsel was ineffective.  The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania denied Thomas’s petition, and we declined to issue a certificate of 
appealability. 
In 2010, Thomas filed the instant complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  He alleged 
that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel during his criminal trial in 
violation of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  According to Thomas, 
the fee schedule for court-appointed counsel in Philadelphia — a schedule that he claims 
the defendants, collectively, created and administer — is grossly inadequate.  Thomas 
contends that due to a lack of funds, his trial counsel was unable to hire a private 
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investigator or otherwise perform an appropriate pretrial investigation.
1
 
The District Court dismissed Thomas’s complaint.  The Court concluded that 
because success on the merits of Thomas’s claims would imply the invalidity of his state 
conviction, they were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).  The Court 
further determined that to the extent that Heck did not bar Thomas’s claims, the statute of 
limitations did, because while § 1983 is subject to a two-year limitations period, see 
Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108, 111 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996), Thomas’s allegations concerned 
events that occurred over 20 years ago.  Thomas then filed a timely notice of appeal. 
We will affirm the District Court’s order.  We agree with the Court that, insofar as 
Thomas seeks damages for his counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness, his claim is barred by 
Heck.  Under Heck, “a prisoner does not have a cognizable § 1983 claim, even if he or 
she does not seek relief from the fact or duration of confinement, for alleged 
unconstitutional conduct that would invalidate his or her underlying sentence or 
conviction unless that conviction has already been called into question.”  Grier v. Klem, 
591 F.3d 672, 677 (3d Cir. 2010).  A meritorious ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim 
requires the movant to show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”  Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).  Thus, as the District Court concluded, a 
                                                 
1
  We note that Samuel Stretton, an attorney, filed a similar complaint in the District 
Court in 2008.  See Civ. A. No. 08-01711.  Thomas filed a motion to intervene in that action, 
which Stretton opposed and the District Court denied.  Thomas then filed a near carbon copy of 
Stretton’s complaint in his own name.  On June 3, 2010, the District Court granted Stretton’s 
unopposed motion to withdraw his complaint. 
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judgment in Thomas’s favor on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim would 
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.  See Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 
F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 
1994) (per curiam).  And, because Thomas’s only previous challenges to his conviction 
have been unsuccessful, his claim is not cognizable under § 1983 at this time.  See 
Hadley v. Werner, 753 F.2d 514, 516 (6th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (so holding in case 
challenging the alleged underfunding of the court-appointed-counsel system). 
In addition to seeking damages for his past harm, Thomas seeks prospective relief 
— a declaratory judgment that the current reimbursement system for court-appointed 
counsel is unconstitutional and an injunction requiring the defendants to raise the 
reimbursement rates.  However, to have standing to bring these types of claims, Thomas 
must show that “he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct 
injury as the result of the challenged official conduct and the injury or threat of injury 
must be both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical.”  City of Los Angeles 
v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “Past exposure 
to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding 
injunctive relief[.]”  O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974).2 
Thus, Thomas has standing for these claims only if he can show that the 
                                                 
2
  While Thomas is still in prison, his “continuing incarceration cannot serve as a 
basis for standing in an action brought under § 1983” in these circumstances.  Brown v. Fauver, 
819 F.2d 395, 400 n.5 (3d Cir. 1987). 
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challenged fee schedule “will produce imminent injury” to him.  Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992).  Critically, in considering the likelihood of future 
injury, the Supreme Court has “been unwilling to assume that the party seeking relief will 
repeat the type of misconduct that would once again place him or her at risk of that 
injury.”  Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 320 (1988).  Thus, we will not assume that Thomas 
will again face criminal charges and require court-appointed defense counsel — a 
conclusion that is reinforced by the fact that he is serving a life sentence.  Nor is it 
apparent that Thomas will have counsel appointed for state collateral proceedings.  While 
Thomas was entitled to counsel for his first round of PCRA proceedings (which he has 
already litigated), Pennsylvania extends no such guarantee to any subsequent petition that 
Thomas may file.  See Pa. R. Crim. P. 904.  Thomas has thus failed to show that he faces 
a real and immediate threat of being injured by Pennsylvania’s attorney-compensation 
system.  See Gardner v. Luckey, 500 F.2d 712, 714-15 (5th Cir. 1974) (“The prospect of 
future injury rests upon the likelihood that the plaintiffs named in the complaint will 
pursue further state court proceedings of a type that are within the statutory scope of duty 
of the Public Defender.  We regard this as too speculative.” (internal citation omitted)).  
Accordingly, he lacks standing to prosecute his claims for prospective injunctive and 
declaratory relief.      
Finally, we discern no error in the District Court’s conclusion that it would be 
futile to permit Thomas to amend his complaint.  See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 
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515 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2008).  Thomas’s claims fail as a matter of law, and he could 
not cure these deficiencies with further pleading. 
 We will thus summarily affirm the District Court’s order dismissing Thomas’s 
complaint.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  We also deny Thomas’s request for the 
appointment of counsel.  See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155-56 (3d Cir. 1993). 
